14.12 | Fall 2025 | Undergraduate

Economic Applications of Game Theory

Lecture 23: Bargaining with Incomplete Information

In this lecture, Ian Ball explains bargaining with incomplete information, a scenario in which at least one party lacks full knowledge of the other’s private information. Plea bargains are an example of this.

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Fall 2025

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